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La implementación de esquemas de metas de inflación ha traído consigo enormes progresos en la 
práctica de la política monetaria. Sin embargo, se podrían lograr mayores avances si los bancos 
centrales que aplican este esquema fueran más específicos, sistemáticos y transparentes respecto de 
sus objetivos operacionales (en la forma de usar una función de pérdida intertemporal explícita), sus 
proyecciones (en sus decisiones sobre proyección óptima de la tasa de interés de política y variables 
objetivo) y su comunicación (en la forma de anunciar proyecciones óptimas de la tasa de interés de 
política y variables objetivo). Más aun, se puede progresar incorporando de manera sistemática el 
criterio del banco central e incertidumbre respecto del modelo al proceso de proyección y toma de 
decisiones. En particular, la incorporación de incertidumbre sobre el  modelo llevaría a los bancos 
centrales hacia un esquema de “metas de distribución de proyecciones” en lugar del esquema 
imperante —pero restrictivo— “metas de proyecciones de la media” bajo el supuesto de equivalencia 
aproximada con certeza. 
 
Abstract  
The introduction of inflation targeting has led to major progress in practical monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, inflation-targeting central banks can make substantial additional progress by being more 
specific, systematic, and transparent about their operational objectives (in the form of using an explicit 
intertemporal loss function), their forecasts (in the form of deciding on optimal projections of the 
instrument rate and the target variables), and their communication (in the form of announcing optimal 
projections of the instrument rate and target variables). Furthermore, progress can be made by 
incorporating central-bank judgment and model uncertainty in a systematic way in the forecasting and 
decision process. In particular, incorporating model uncertainty allows the central bank to do more 
general “distribution forecast targeting” rather than the more restrictive “mean forecast targeting” 
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and National Bureau of Economic Research 
Inflation targeting was first introduced in 1990, in New Zealand. 
Since then it has been adopted by more than twenty countries. This 
period of fifteen years has seen major progress in practical monetary 
policy. In particular, the practice of inflation targeting has led to a 
more systematic and consistent internal decision process (Brash, 2000; 
Sims, 2002; Svensson 2001a); much more transparent communication 
with the private sector (Blinder and others, 2001; Fracasso, Genberg, 
and Wyplosz, 2003; Leeper, 2003); and an unprecedented degree of 
accountability. The monetary and real stability achieved is exceptional 
from a historical perspective (King, 2002). 
Given this progress, many might think that further improvement 
is hardly possible, and that monetary policy bliss, or something very 
close to it, may have been reached. I believe that there is still room for 
further development and improvement, even though past achievements 
by inflation-targeting central banks have been very impressive. This 
paper provides a very selective discussion of points on which I believe 
further improvements are both possible and desirable.
Good inflation targeting shares these characteristics:
•  An explicit monetary policy objective in the form of a numerical 
inflation target, now with an increasingly explicit concern not 
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only about stability of inflation around the target but also about 
stability of the real economy. The target variables under inflation 
targeting include both inflation and a real variable, such as the 
output gap.1
•  An internal decision process—“forecast targeting”—in which 
projections of the target variables have a prominent role and the 
central bank sets the instrument rate such that the forecast of 
the target variables “looks good” relative to the monetary policy 
objective.2
•  A very high degree of transparency and accountability, with the 
central bank typically publishing its internal projections and 
providing detailed motivations of them and of its instrument-rate 
decisions, in order to both implement the policy effectively and 
allow detailed external scrutiny of the bank’s performance. 
I believe that further improvements are possible and desirable on 
all three points. With regard to the first point, the monetary policy 
objective—that is, the inclusion of not only an inflation stability 
objective but also an objective of stabilizing the real economy—has 
been called “flexible” inflation targeting.3 Inflation-targeting 
central banks normally acknowledge in different ways that they are 
flexible inflation targeters.4 However, they are not very explicit and 
transparent and probably not very consistent about the relative weight 
they attach to stability of variables other than inflation. They may 
not be very consistent about intertemporal substitution between the 
target variables either. Some refer to a fixed horizon, such as eight 
quarters, by which the inflation target shall be met, but a fixed horizon 
is easily shown not to be appropriate for most circumstances (Faust and 
Henderson, 2004). I believe specifying operational objectives in terms 
of an explicit intertemporal loss function—initially for internal use 
within the central bank, later, after a trial period, to be published—is 
an easy way to make substantial progress in this regard.
1. By target variables, I mean the variables that are arguments of the central 
bank’s explicit or implicit loss function.
2. By instrument rate, I mean the short-term nominal interest rate that the central 
bank is using as an instrument or operating target.
3. The terms flexible and strict inflation targeting were to my knowledge first 
introduced in a paper of mine presented at a conference at the Bank of Portugal in 
1996, later published as Svensson (1999).
4. Norges Bank (the Bank of Norway) is a model of transparency in this respect (and 
many others): Each Inflation Report contains the statement “Norges Bank operates a 
flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given to both variability in inflation 
and variability in output and employment.” Norges Bank also puts the inflation forecast 
and the output gap forecast in the same graph, in order to emphasize both.2 Lars E.O. Svensson 3 Optimal Inflation Targeting
With regard to the second point, the internal decision process, the 
instrument-rate assumption under which projections of the target 
variables are made has received considerable attention. Several central 
banks have used the assumption of a constant instrument rate during 
the entire forecast horizon. This assumption is very problematic for 
several reasons (see Archer, 2004; 2005; Bean, 2003; Goodhart, 2001; 
Heikensten, 2005; Honkapohja and Mitra, 2005; Leitemo, 2003; 
Lomax, 2005; Svensson, 2003a; Woodford, 2005). A few central banks 
have shifted to the assumption of an instrument-rate path given by 
market expectations of future instrument rates. This is a considerable 
improvement but is arguably not the best alternative.
Furthermore, central banks normally make explicit decisions 
and announcements only about the current instrument rate (the 
instrument rate for the next month or two) and its level during 
the period until the next monetary policy decision. However, the 
current instrument rate matters very little for the central banks’ 
internal projections. What matters for those projections is the entire 
instrument-rate path assumed. 
Similarly, the current instrument rate matters very little for 
private sector decisions and the economy. What matter are private 
sector expectations about the entire future path of the instrument rate. 
These expectations feed into the yield curve and thereby longer-term 
interest rates and asset prices, which do affect private sector decisions. 
The current central bank decision and announcement actually matters 
only to the degree that it affects private sector expectations of the path 
of future instrument rates. This means that when the central bank 
decides on a particular current instrument-rate level, it implicitly 
decides on and announces an expected future instrument-rate path, 
an instrument-rate plan. For these reasons I believe that substantial 
progress can be made if central banks explicitly think in terms of entire 
instrument-rate plans and corresponding projections of target variables 
and develop a decision process in which the central bank explicitly 
chooses such an instrument plan. Indeed, the decision process should 
be designed so as to end with an optimal instrument-rate plan and a 
corresponding optimal projection of the target variables—a projection 
of the instrument rate and the target variables that minimize the 
central bank’s loss function. 
With regard to the third point, the high degree of transparency 
and accountability, inflation-targeting central banks typically publish 
their internal projections of their target variables (although some 
may publish projections of output or output growth rather than the 4 Lars E.O. Svensson 5 Optimal Inflation Targeting
output gap). Since these projections are normally based on an assumed 
instrument-rate path that differs from the optimal instrument-rate 
plan (especially if there is no explicit optimal instrument-rate plan), 
the resulting projections are not the best forecasts, in the sense of 
minimizing expected squared forecast errors. The projections are 
biased one way or another. Hence they are not the best information 
for the private sector. Since monetary policy has an impact on the 
economy via the private sector expectations of inflation, output, and 
interest rates that it gives rise to, announcing the optimal projection 
(including the instrument-rate projection) and the analysis behind it 
would have the greatest impact on private sector expectations and 
be the most effective way to implement monetary policy. Since the 
optimal projection is the best forecast, in the sense of minimizing 
expected squared forecast errors, it also provides the private sector 
with the best aggregate information for making individual decisions. 
Announcing the optimal projection also allows the most precise and 
sophisticated external evaluation of the monetary policy framework 
and decisions. For these reasons I believe that substantial progress 
can be made if inflation-targeting central banks publish and explain 
optimal projections, including the optimal instrument-rate plan. The 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand has been doing this since 1997; Norges 
Bank, the central bank of Norway, has been doing so since 2005. 
In short, I believe that inflation-targeting central banks can 
make substantial progress by being more specific, systematic, and 
transparent about their operational objectives (by using an explicit 
intertemporal loss function), their forecasts (by deciding on optimal 
projections of the instrument rate and the target variables), and their 
communication (by announcing optimal projections of the instrument 
rate and target variables).
Substantial progress can also be made regarding the systematic 
use of central bank judgment—that is, information, knowledge, and 
views that beyond the scope of a particular model. Although formal 
models are very useful in practical monetary policy, they are drastic 
simplifications of a complex economy. Judgment will always be 
necessary. The challenge is to apply good judgment in a disciplined 
and systematic way rather than in a completely discretionary and ad 
hoc way. Svensson (2005b) discusses in greater detail how central bank 
judgment can be incorporated into optimal projections in a consistent 
way. Svensson and Tetlow (2005) describe a practical way to do so, 
the method of optimal policy projections, which is to some extent in 
use at the Federal Reserve Board.4 Lars E.O. Svensson 5 Optimal Inflation Targeting
Monetary policy is always conducted under substantial uncertainty. 
As long as the uncertainty is mainly in the form of exogenous additive 
shocks, the combination of linear models and quadratic loss functions 
implies that certainty equivalence holds and that projections in the 
form of probability means are sufficient for optimal policy. When 
certainty equivalence is violated—for instance, because the uncertainty 
is multiplicative and not just additive—mean projections are no 
longer sufficient for optimal policy. In this case the entire probability 
distribution of future random target variables matters. Svensson and 
Williams (2005) develop a flexible and powerful but still tractable 
framework for optimal monetary policy under quite general form 
model uncertainty that allows simple multiplicative uncertainty as 
well as more complex structural model uncertainty. Although certainty 
equivalence is violated, forecast targeting can still be undertaken, with 
the projections probability distributions rather than mean projections. 
The decision process can then be seen as distribution forecast targeting 
rather than mean forecast targeting.5 A systematic approach to model 
uncertainty and distribution forecast targeting is another area in which 
substantial progress in inflation targeting can be made.
The next section discusses how an explicit intertemporal loss function 
can be introduced and used by a central bank. Section 3 discusses the 
instrument-rate assumption. Section 4 discusses transparency and 
communication issues. Section 5 discusses how central bank judgment 
can be incorporated in a systematic way. Section 6 discusses model 
uncertainty and distribution forecast targeting. Section 7 briefly 
examines optimization under commitment, the timeless perspective, 
and discretion. Section 8 briefly examines the output gap, the potential 
output, the interest-rate gap, and the neutral interest rate. Section 9 
presents some conclusions. The appendix contains technical material 
on the loss function and the interest-rate gap.
1. THE LOSS FUNCTION
All real world inflation targeting is flexible. Flexible inflation 
targeting means that monetary policy objectives include not only 
stability of inflation around the inflation target but also stability of 
the real economy, such as the stability of the output gap.6 
5. The terms mean forecast targeting and distribution forecast targeting were, to 
my knowledge, introduced in Svensson (2001b).
6. “ Strict” inflation targeting, when the central bank is concerned exclusively about 
inflation, is an abstraction that is sometimes used in pedagogical examples.6 Lars E.O. Svensson 7 Optimal Inflation Targeting
Although inflation-targeting central banks normally acknowledge 
that they are flexible inflation targeters, they are normally not very 
explicit or transparent—and probably not very consistent— about the 
relative weights they attach to the stability of variables other than 
inflation. They may not be very consistent about the intertemporal 
substitution between the target variables either. Some central 
bankers refer to a fixed horizon, such as eight quarters, over which 
the inflation target shall be met, but a fixed horizon is easily shown 
to be inappropriate for most circumstances (Faust and Henderson, 
2004). Some state that they have a medium-term objective, without 
specifying what this means. 
The most direct way to resolve this ambiguity and lack of 
transparency is to specify an explicit intertemporal loss function as the 
operational objective for the central bank. This clarifies what the target 
variables are and what relative weights they have. It clarifies both 
intra- and intertemporal substitution between levels and stability of 
the target variables and allows an unambiguous ranking of alternative 
projections of the target variables.
Flexible inflation targeting implies that the central bank is 
not concerned exclusively about stabilizing inflation around the 
inflation target but is also concerned with the stability of the real 
economy, as represented by the output gap, the employment gap, 
or the unemployment gap.7 This can conveniently be expressed as a 
conventional quadratic loss function,
Lt t t x ≡ − ( ) + π π λ
* ,
2 2                                                                     (1)
where Lt denotes the period loss in period t (where the period may be 
a quarter, for instance); πt denotes a measure of inflation in period 
t; π* denotes the inflation target; xt denotes a measure of the output 
gap in period t; and λ > 0 denotes the relative weight on output-gap 
stabilization relative to inflation stabilization.8 The central bank may 
also be concerned about the variability of instrument-rate changes or 
exchange-rate changes, which would correspond to additional terms 
λ∆i t t i i − ( ) −1
2orλ∆i t t s s − ( ) −1
2, where it denotes the instrument rate 
7. I use the output gap (the difference between output and potential output) 
as the generic variable representing the business cycle status of the economy. The 
unconditional mean of the output gap is taken to be zero.
8. The index of inflation, πt, can be quarterly inflation, four-quarter inflation, or 
an average of inflation over a longer period (Nessén and Vestin, 2005).6 Lars E.O. Svensson 7 Optimal Inflation Targeting
and st denotes the (log) exchange rate in period t. In this case the 
instrument rate or the exchange rate are also target variables.9
The corresponding intertemporal loss function in period t can then be 
written as the sum of current and expected discounted future losses,








,                                                                                  (2)
where  Et  denotes  central  bank  expectations  conditional  on 
information available in period t and δ is a discount factor that 
fulfills 0 < δ ≤ 1.10 Whereas the period loss function and the weight 
λ express the substitution between inflation and output-gap 
variability within a given period, the intertemporal loss function 
and the discount factor δ express the substitution between expected 
losses in different periods.
Letπ τ t t + , andxt t +τ, for τ ≥ 0 denote (mean) projections in period t 
of inflation and the output gap τ periods ahead, respectively, and let 
π π π
t
t t t t ≡( ) + , , , , 1 …  and  x x x
t
t t t t ≡( ) + , , , , 1 …  denote (mean) projections in 
period t of the current and future inflation and output gaps, respectively. 
That is,  π τ t t + ,  and  xt t +τ,  denote the projection in period t of inflation 
and the output gap in period t + τ, whereas πt and xt denote the entire 
projection paths of current and future inflation and output gap.
LetLt t +τ, denote the period loss associated in period t with the 
projectionsπ τ t t + , andxt t +τ, of inflation and the output gap for period t + τ,
L x t t t t t t + + + ≡ − ( ) + τ τ τ π π λ , , , * ,
2 2                                                              (3)
and letL π
t t x , ) ( denote the intertemporal loss associated in period t 











.                                                                         (4)
Once the two parameters δ and λ have been determined, the 
intertemporal loss function L π
t t x , ) ( provides a convenient and 
consistent way to rank different inflation and output-gap projections. 
Suppose that the central bank staff presents the monetary policy 
committee with two different instrument-rate plans, which result in 
9. Rudebusch (2005) surveys recent work on instrument-rate smoothing. Woodford 
(2003) and Svensson (2003c) provide further discussion of interest rates as target 
variables.
10. When δ = 1, the loss function (2) should be interpreted as the limit (from below) 
limδ
τ
τ τ δ δ → + =
∞
− − ( ) ∑ 1 0 1 E L t t in order to ensure convergence (see appendix).8 Lars E.O. Svensson
two different projections of inflation and the output gap.11 Suppose 
that the first instrument-rate plan results in the projection π
t t x
1 1 , ( )
and that the second instrument-rate plan results in the projection
π
t t x
2 2 , ( ). Which instrument plan should the monetary policy committee 
choose? If the parameters δ and λ correspond to the monetary policy 
committee’s preferences, it should simply choose the instrument plan 
that results in the inflation and output-gap projection with the lowest 
loss. Suppose that  L π
t t x
1 1 , ( )<L π
t t x
2 2 , ( ). Then the monetary policy 
committee should choose the first instrument-rate plan and associated 
inflation and output projections.
How can the monetary policy committee determine the parameters δ 
and λ? A discount factor δ equal to one implies that the loss in future periods 
has the same weight as current losses. My guess is that most committee 
members would agree that a discount factor equal to or close to one is 
appropriate, given the frequent emphasis on the medium and long run and 
a desire to avoid myopia. Then only λ remains to be determined.
The monetary policy committee can determine λ explicitly or 
implicitly in several ways. It can determine λ explicitly by majority 
voting. In this case, by the median voter theorem, the resulting λ 
will be the median of the distribution of the committee members’ 
individual λs. This is a convenient and practical way of aggregating 
the committee members’ preferences. Majority voting has the general 
advantage that single extreme views do not affect the outcome, since 
outliers normally do not affect the median.
If committee members need help determining their individual 
λs, the λs can be determined implicitly through revealed preference 
experiments. For instance, suppose a committee member chooses the 
preferred combination of inflation and output-gap projections among 
a few alternatives. This choice then reveals the range of implicit λs 
for which that choice is preferred. Suppose that committee members 
are presented with the three alternative combinations of inflation 
gap and output-gap projections shown in figure 1 (where the inflation 
gap is the deviation from a fixed inflation target) and asked to choose 
the alternative they prefer. This choice would narrow the range of λs 
consistent with their choice.12
11. I use monetary policy committee as the generic term for the monetary policy 
decisionmaking body of the central bank, including when the bank has a single 
decisionmaker.
12. The figures are plotted for the Rudebusch-Svensson model in Svensson (2005b), 
with the same initial situation of a steady zero output gap, a steady 0.5 percentage 
point inflation gap, and three different values of λ. For two given policy alternatives, 
π
t t x
1 1 , ( )and π
t t x
2 2 , ( ), if the monetary policy committee prefers one alternative, one can 
determine the range of λs for which that alternative gives lower intertemporal loss.8 Lars E.O. Svensson
Figure 1. Projected Inflation and Output Gaps Given 
Alternative Weights on Output-Gap Stabilization
Source: Svensson (2005b).
Note: The solid line shows the inflation gap (π – π*). The dashed line shows the output gap (x).10 Lars E.O. Svensson 11 Optimal Inflation Targeting
The λ can also be determined implicitly over time, revealed by the 
policy decisions the committee makes. To many committee members, 
this may be the most natural way to determine λ. If the central 
bank staff present the monetary policy committee with a few policy 
alternatives at each decision point (where each policy alternative 
consists of an inflation path, an output-gap path, and an interest 
rate path), the selected policy alternatives will over time narrow the 
range of λs consistent with the committee’s decisions. It will also reveal 
whether the λs seem to be constant over time or time varying.
If the central bank puts weight on instrument-rate smoothing or 
exchange rate smoothing, the parametersλ∆iandλ∆salso need to be 
determined. If the committee members do not agree that the discount 
factor δ is equal to unity, they can vote about the discount factor, too, 
in which case the resulting discount factor will be the median of their 
individual discount factors.
Using an explicit intertemporal loss function such as (4) has 
several advantages:
•  An explicit intertemporal loss function clarifies what the target 
variables are and resolves in an unambiguous way the intra- 
and intertemporal substitution between them. One projection of 
inflation and the output gap may have a negative output gap in the 
near future and lower inflation in the more distant future, whereas 
another may have a less negative output gap in the near future 
and higher inflation in the more distant future. The intertemporal 
loss function provides a consistent ranking of the two projections. 
The loss function makes clear that the entire projection path of the 
target variables matters, not just the projections at some particular 
horizon. It thus avoids the tendency to put weight on a particular 
horizon, such as eight quarters (see Faust and Henderson, 2004 
and Heikensten, 1999).
•  A loss function clarifies the unnecessary and unhelpful distinction 
between a “dual” and a “hierarchical” mandate (see Meyer, 2004 
and Svensson, 2004); removes any ambiguity about the degree 
of flexibility in inflation targeting (for instance, in the debate 
on inflation targeting for the Federal Reserve; Kohn, 2003), and 
clarifies the appropriate role of asset prices and concerns about 
bubbles in inflation targeting (Bean, 2003).
•  The monetary policy committee has to make choices between 
different  projection  combinations  in  any  case;  using  an 
intertemporal loss function avoids other inconsistent and ad hoc 
ways of making such choices. 10 Lars E.O. Svensson 11 Optimal Inflation Targeting
•  It is important to realize that a loss function does not require that 
projections be made with a model; the loss function can be used to 
rank purely judgmental projections.
•  The loss function can be seen as a necessary operational 
interpretation of a legislative mandate or government instruction, 
which is usually too vague to provide precise guidance to consistent 
policy in particular policy situations. Such an operational 
interpretation is already needed for the inflation target in some 
countries (such as Sweden and countries in the euro zone), where 
the institutional arrangement for monetary policy leaves the 
central bank in charge of deciding on the number and index for 
the inflation target.
•  The parameters of the loss function have clear intuitive meaning. 
The discount factor δ represents the substitution between period 
losses in different periods: the weight of a period loss in one period 
relative to the period loss one period earlier. The weight λ can be 
interpreted as the weight on variability of the output gap relative 
to variability of inflation, so λ = 1 implies that the monetary policy 
committee is equally concerned with the variability of the output 
gap as with the variability of inflation (see the appendix).
•  The monetary policy committee can add any target variables that 
it is concerned about with corresponding weights. Thus, it can 
include instrument-rate and/or exchange-rate smoothing and/or 
stabilization; unemployment-gap stabilization; or output-growth 
gap stabilization. (Mentioning these possibilities does not imply 
that I endorse them.) 
•  The monetary policy committee can use a loss function of other 
forms than the quadratic if it believes another loss function 
better represents its objectives.13 (However, the quadratic loss 
function has many advantages. It can be seen as a second-order 
approximation to a more general loss function, its symmetry 
seems natural in an era in which both inflation and deflation are 
undesirable, and it is easy to use in optimization exercises.)
•  If the monetary policy committee would prefer not to specify a 
loss function for some time, the staff can still provide it with 
optimal projections for a reasonab e set of alternative parameters 
of the loss function. This set of optimal projections for different 
parameters then forms the set of efficient feasible projections from 
13. Bray and Goodhart (2002) and Svensson (2003b) discuss other functional forms. 
Ruge-Murcia (2003) discusses inflation targeting with asymmetric preferences.12 Lars E.O. Svensson 13 Optimal Inflation Targeting
which the monetary policy committee should choose its preferred 
alternative.
•  The monetary policy committee can experiment with internal uses 
of alternative loss functions and go public about any loss function 
at a later stage, when it has decided which loss function to use 
and the approach has proved useful.
•  Eventually going public about the loss function will increase the 
transparency of monetary policy, improve precision and consistency 
in the evaluation of monetary policy, and increase accountability. 
It may also bring better public understanding of the substitutions 
and tradeoffs involved. 
Consequently, I believe that specifying operational objectives in 
terms of an explicit intertemporal loss function is an easy way to 
significantly improve inflation targeting.14
2. THE INSTRUMENT-RATE PROJECTION
Because of lags in the transmission mechanism between 
monetary policy actions and effects on the economy and the target 
variables, good monetary policy must be forward looking and rely on 
projections of the target variables. Before it makes its instrument-
rate decision, the monetary policy committee is normally presented 
with a number of alternative projections of the target variables, 
14. Mishkin (2004) summarizes his arguments against central banks announcing a 
loss function—and implicitly also against central banks using one (My counterarguments 
in parentheses.) Argument: It may be difficult for monetary policy committee members 
to specify a loss function, let alone to agree on a loss function (I have already mentioned 
simple procedures to specify and agree on a loss function.) Argument: It is far from 
clear who should decide on the loss function (The loss function can always be seen as 
a necessary operationalization of the central bank’s mandate.) Argument: it may be 
difficult to communicate a loss function to the public (Even a very precise statement like 
“a weight on output gap stabilization equal to half the weight on inflation stabilization” 
does not seem incomprehensible for an educated general public.) Argument: Announcing 
a positive weight on output gap stabilization may lead to more aggressive private 
sector price and wage increases (There is no evidence of such increases after Norges 
Bank became more explicit about output gap stability, and Norway has powerful trade 
unions!) Argument: Announcing a positive weight on output gap stabilization will 
require the central bank to publish estimates of the output gap and potential output, 
and a conceptually correct estimation of potential output is difficult (True, but such 
estimation is necessary for good policy.) Difficulty is not a good argument in this context. 
It is difficult to provide inflation forecasts. This is no longer—if it ever was—a valid 
argument against publishing them. Before the introduction of inflation targeting in 
New Zealand, I am sure almost every central banker thought that the current standard 
of transparency would be impossible to achieve, and many probably thought it would 
be potentially harmful even if it could be achieved.12 Lars E.O. Svensson 13 Optimal Inflation Targeting
conditional on alternative assumptions about the state of the economy, 
the development of various exogenous variables, the transmission 
mechanism, and so forth. These projections are conditional on some 
assumption about the instrument-rate path.
The decision process results in a decision about the level of the 
instrument rate for the immediate future. Implicitly or explicitly, 
however, this decision is actually about an instrument-rate plan. The 
optimal instrument-rate plan is the plan that results in an optimal 
projection of the target variables, the projection that minimizes the 
intertemporal loss function. This projection is also the best forecast, 
in the sense of minimizing expected squared forecast errors.15
2.1 The Instrument-Rate Assumption Underlying 
Projections of the Target Variables
Traditionally, several inflation-targeting central banks have used 
projections based on an assumption of a constant instrument rate over 
the forecast horizon. If, everything else equal, the inflation projection is 
higher (lower) than the inflation target at some given horizon, usually 
about eight quarters, this has been interpreted as indicating that 
sooner or later the instrument rate needs to be raised (lowered).
There are numerous problems with the constant instrument-rate 
assumption.16 These include: 
•  A constant instrument rate is often unrealistic. This implies that 
the resulting projection of inflation and the output gap is unrealistic 
and not the best forecast of future inflation and the output gap. 
This in turn makes it difficult and misleading to compare these 
15. I use the following terminology: Feasible projections (or the set of feasible 
projections) are the (mean) projections of the instrument rate and the target variables 
that are consistent with the central bank’s information, more specifically, its estimate of 
the state of the economy, view of the transmission mechanism, and forecast of exogenous 
variables. The optimal projection is the central bank’s preferred feasible projection of 
the instrument rate and the target variables—that is, the feasible projection that best 
achieves the central bank’s objective. More specifically, the optimal projection is the 
feasible projection that minimizes the central bank’s intertemporal loss function. The 
best forecast is the projection that best predicts the actual future path of the variables in 
question, more precisely, the projection that minimizes expected squared forecast errors. 
A conditional forecast is a projection that minimizes expected squared forecast errors 
subject to some particular assumption, such as a particular path of the instrument rate. 
The unconditional forecast is the best projection given available information, including 
information about monetary policy. The unconditional forecast is the best forecast.
16. See Archer (2004, 2005); Bean (2004); Goodhart (2001); Heikensten (2005); 
Honkapohja and Mitra (2005); Leitemo (2003); Lomax (2005); Svensson (2003a); and 
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projections to those of other forecasters, which normally assume 
more realistic underlying instrument-rate paths. It also makes 
it difficult and misleading to compare the projections to actual 
outcomes and in this way to assess the forecast performance of 
the central bank.
•  A constant instrument rate often differs from market expectations 
of future interest rates. Current asset prices (exchange rates, stock 
market prices, bond prices, housing prices, and so forth) depend on 
these market expectations. Typically, the current market prices of 
these assets are used as inputs in central bank projections rather 
than the hypothetical asset prices that would result if market 
participants actually expected a constant instrument rate. Hence 
the central bank projections end up using many inputs that are 
inconsistent with the constant instrument rate, making the 
projections inherently inconsistent and misleading. Put differently, 
they are not consistent constant instrument-rate projections but 
a mixture of projections based partly on the constant instrument 
rate, partly on market expectations of future interest rates.
•  When market expectations of future interest rates differ from 
the constant instrument rate, central banks typically would not 
like market expectations of future interest rates to adjust toward 
the constant instrument rate. If that happens, it may result in 
drastic and unwelcome changes in asset prices. Hence central 
banks using constant instrument-rate projections would normally 
not like the private sector to take the constant instrument-rate 
assumption seriously.
•  For a constant instrument rate, most projection models are 
unstable, and the inflation and output-gap projections tend to 
increase or decrease at an increasing rate with a longer horizon, 
making longer-term projections more or less useless. This has 
induced central banks to avoid plotting such projections for longer 
horizons, in order not to display the problems with constant 
instrument-rate projections too openly. Projection models with 
forward-looking variables are normally not even determinate 
for a constant instrument rate. Determinacy is restored by the 
assumed shift to some endogenous instrument setting in the form 
of an ad hoc reaction function beyond the forecast horizon. That 
shift is often associated with a drastic and awkward jump in the 
instrument rate, and the projection for shorter horizons depends on 
the assumed future endogenous policy. Alternatively, the projection 
model assumes that the instrument rate follows some determinacy-14 Lars E.O. Svensson 15 Optimal Inflation Targeting
inducing ad hoc reaction function, but unanticipated shocks to the 
instrument rate make it constant for many quarters.17 
For these reasons the constant instrument-rate assumption for 
projections is inherently problematic and confusing. Since there are 
better alternatives, it should be abandoned sooner rather than later. 
Several central banks, including Norges Bank, the Bank of England, 
Sveriges Riksbank, and the European Central Bank, have abandoned 
the constant instrument-rate assumption. The Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand has used projections based on a time-varying instrument 
rate since 1997.
A first alternative to a constant instrument rate is market 
expectations of future instrument rates, normally identified with 
forward interest rates implied by the yield curve. The Bank of 
England, the Riksbank, and the European Central Bank use market 
expectations of future interest rates for their projections. Market 
expectations of future interest rates are usually more realistic than the 
constant instrument rate, depending on the market’s understanding 
and prediction of future instrument-rate decisions. This makes 
projections based on them better forecasts of future instrument-rate 
decisions than constant instrument-rate projections. Moreover, since 
current asset prices are conditional on market expectations of future 
interest rates, using current asset prices as inputs in the projections 
does not cause any apparent inconsistency, in contrast to the case for 
constant instrument-rate projections. 
Using market expectations of future interest rates may be 
problematic, however, if these expectations are peculiar in some way 
or deviate substantially from the central bank’s preferred instrument 
plan—a situation that would indicate either a credibility problem or 
differences between the private sector’s and the central bank’s views 
of the state of the economy or the transmission mechanism. In such 
situations the central bank may want to use ad hoc adjustments of the 
instrument-rate projection implied by market expectations of future 
interest rates. Furthermore, market expectations of future interest 
rates would not normally be identical to the central bank’s explicit 
or implicit instrument plan; the projections based on them would 
therefore normally not be the best forecast, the forecast that minimizes 
17. See Leeper and Zha (forthcoming) for a formalization of this idea with an 
estimated reaction function. In practice the shocks are assumed to be unanticipated 
and not to affect market expectations, although they will be serially correlated for 
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expected squared forecast errors.18 Woodford (2005) provides more 
detailed criticism of market expectations of future interest rates.19
A second alternative for the instrument-rate assumption is an ad 
hoc reaction function for the instrument rate, such as a Taylor-type 
rule. Such an assumption results in projections in which inflation 
eventually approaches the inflation target and the output gap 
eventually approaches zero. The resulting instrument-rate projections 
will generally differ from market expectations of future interest rates. 
(To the extent that the projections are published and interpreted by 
the private sector as good forecasts of future instrument rates, they 
may bring market expectations of future interest rates closer to that 
instrument-rate projection.) The resulting projections of the target 
variables will generally not minimize an intertemporal loss function, 
and there is no reason why the instrument-rate projections will be 
good forecasts of the central bank’s actual instrument-rate setting. 
The resulting projections are to some extent arbitrary.20 However, 
if the reaction function used is an estimate of previous policy by the 
central bank, the resulting projections can be interpreted as those 
18. Although private sector expectations are a natural and important input in 
central bank projections, it is important that they be only one set of inputs among many 
and that the central bank does not respond mechanically to private sector expectations 
that in turn depend on the central bank’s response. As Woodford (1994) and Bernanke 
and Woodford (1997) show, a mindless and mechanical response to private sector 
expectations may lead to indeterminacy and a loss of the nominal anchor.
19. One particular problem emphasized by Woodford (1994) is that an exogenous 
instrument-rate path—whether it is constant, given by market expectations, or the 
optimal path—may imply multiple or unstable equilibria in models with forward-
looking variables. The technical reason for such a problem is that the set of reduced-
form eigenvalues violates the so-called saddlepoint property, namely that the set 
of eigenvalues with modulus above unity must be exactly equal to the number of 
nonpredetermined variables. The usual solution to this problem is to specify a reduced-
form reaction function in which the instrument rate responds to endogenous variables 
and the corresponding reduced-form eigenvalues satisfy the saddlepoint property. 
However, as Svensson and Woodford (2005) show, any such exogenous instrument-
rate path can be combined with a commitment to a specific “out-of-equilibrium” 
response by the central bank to restore a unique and stable equilibrium. For instance, 
if inflation deviates ex post from and exceeds the equilibrium value consistent with 
the instrument-rate projection, the instrument rate would be increased more than 
one-to-one with inflation. More generally, these out-of-equilibrium commitments can 
be constructed in the form of an instrument-rate response to violations of the first-order 
condition for optimal policy, the optimal targeting rule. This can be done so that the right 
reduced-form eigenvalue configuration is created. In this case, in equilibrium no out-
of-equilibrium response will be observed, and the instrument rate and the equilibrium 
will be consistent with the exogenous instrument-rate path.
20. See Svensson (2003a) for a more general critique of simple instrument rules 
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resulting from “policy as usual” (Berg, Jansson, and Vredin, 2004; 
Jansson and Vredin, 2003). Essentially, the projections would be 
analogous to vector autoregression forecasts.21 The Reserve Bank 
of New Zealand uses an ad hoc reaction function in its forecast and 
policy system (discussed in Archer, 2004, 2005; Svensson, 2001a). 
However, the resulting instrument-rate path is subject to considerable 
adjustment that reflects judgment and policy preferences and makes 
it for practical purposes similar to an optimal instrument-rate plan 
(Archer, 2005).22
A third alternative is to use optimal instrument-rate projections, 
that is, instrument-rate projections for which the resulting projections 
of the target variables minimize an intertemporal loss function. 
The staff can present optimal projections of target variables and 
the instrument rate for alternative parameter values of the loss 
function and alternative scenarios. This can be done in several ways, 
incorporating judgment, as discussed in Svensson (2005b). Svensson 
and Tetlow (2005) describe the method of optimal policy projections, a 
variant of which is being used by the Federal Reserve Board.23 If the 
monetary policy committee agrees on an intertemporal loss function, 
the staff can present it with optimal projections for that loss function 
for different scenarios (different assumptions about the state of the 
economy, forecasts of exogenous variables, and the transmission 
mechanism, for instance). If the monetary policy committee does not 
agree on a loss function or does not use a particular loss function, 
the staff can still present the relevant tradeoffs for different policy 
choices—the set of efficient feasible projections—by presenting 
projections for a few different parameters of the loss function. If 
the monetary policy committee chooses policy in line with this, the 
resulting projection will be the best forecast, in the sense of minimizing 
expected squared forecast errors.
As mentioned, since 1997 the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
has relied on a time-varying instrument-rate projection that can be 
interpreted as an optimal instrument-rate projection. Norges Bank 
first published a time-varying instrument-rate projection that can be 
interpreted as an optimal instrument-rate path in March 2005. The 
21. Blinder (2006) suggests using an empirical reaction function.
22. The particular reaction function used before any judgmental and policy 
adjustments, a variant of a so-called forecast-based Taylor rule originating with Bank 
of Canada’s quarterly projection model, has some particular problems, discussed in 
Svensson (2001c).
23. By central bank judgment, I mean information, knowledge, and views beyond 
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presentation of optimal projections of inflation, the output gap, the 
exchange rate, and the interest rate has been refined, with fan charts, 
extensive discussion, and cross-checking, in consecutive inflation 
reports (see Qvigstad, 2005 and Svensson, 2005a for a discussion of 
the Norwegian example). 
2.2 The Instrument-Rate Decision
The assumption about the current instrument rate matters 
very little for the central bank’s projections. What matters is the 
assumption about the entire future instrument-rate path. Similarly, 
the current instrument rate matters very little for private sector 
economic decisions. What matters is the private sector expectations 
about future instrument rates. These expectations feed into the yield 
curve and affect longer-term interest rates and asset prices, which do 
affect private sector decisions. 
The current instrument rate and central bank announcement have 
an effect on the economy essentially only through the private sector 
expectations they give rise to about future instrument rates and future 
inflation and output. Indeed, it is paradoxical that so much attention 
and discussion is focused on current instrument-rate settings and 
levels, when what matter are the related plans and expectations about 
future instrument rates. As is becoming increasingly well known, and 
as Woodford (2004) and Svensson and Woodford (2005) emphasize, 
modern monetary policy is essentially the management of private 
sector expectations.
Since the current instrument rate has very little importance and 
it is the entire future instrument-rate path that matters, explicitly 
or implicitly the central bank instrument decision is really a decision 
about the future path of the instrument rate, about an instrument-rate 
plan. To some extent this is becoming increasingly recognized. A good 
example is the increased attention paid to some key words in Federal 
Open Market Committee statements (www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/) 
indicating future instrument-rate setting: “policy accommodation can be 
maintained for a considerable period,” “[the Committee] can be patient 
in removing its policy accommodation,” and “policy accommodation can 
be removed at a pace that is likely to be measured”(italics added).24
My conclusion from this is that central banks should be more 
specific, systematic, and transparent about instrument-rate paths 
and plans. Since the decision about the instrument rate is in effect 
a decision about the instrument-rate path, it is better that this be 18 Lars E.O. Svensson 19 Optimal Inflation Targeting
explicitly acknowledged. Maintaining that the decision is one about 
the current instrument-rate levels alone is both misdirected and 
misleading. Indeed, throughout the decision process, it should be 
natural to think in terms of alternative instrument-rate paths and 
plans, not about the instrument rate during the next month or two. 
Similarly, it should be natural to think in terms of entire projection 
paths of future target variables, not just the current level, the target 
variables, or the projection at some particular horizon, such as eight 
quarters. Furthermore, the discussion of the intertemporal loss 
function above makes clear that the loss function induces a ranking 
of entire projection paths, not projections at particular horizons. 
Indeed, the monetary policy transmission mechanism should be seen 
as a mapping from an instrument-rate path to target variable paths, 
not as a mapping from an instrument-rate level to a level of the target 
variables at some particular horizon.
Goodhart (2001, 2005) and Mishkin (2004) argue that it is too 
difficult for a monetary policy committee to agree on a path (a sequence 
of numbers) rather than a current instrument-rate decision (a single 
number). I argue that doing so is neither necessary nor too difficult 
and that it is already being done. Monetary policy committees all over 
the globe decide on projections of inflation and output all the time. 
Projections are paths, sequences of numbers. Why would there be a 
big difference between agreeing on an instrument-rate path and an 
inflation path? Moreover, some central banks, such as the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand and Norges Bank, are already explicitly deciding 
on instrument-rate paths.25
In particular, majority voting about paths is completely feasible. 
One possibility is that the staff prepare two or three alternative 
sets of projections, each with a particular instrument-rate path and 
corresponding projections of the inflation and the output gap (perhaps 
24. Imagine how much more transparent this communication would have been if 
the Federal Open Market Committee instead had plotted an instrument-rate projection, 
as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and Norges Bank are already doing.
25. At the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the governor is the single decisionmaker 
and is advised by an internal monetary policy committee. The single decisionmaker is 
sometimes said to simplify the decision about the interest rate path (Goodhart 2001, 
2005). My information about monetary policy committee meetings, gained especially 
during my review of monetary policy in New Zealand (Svensson 2001a), indicates 
that decisions are normally made in a very collegial manner, similar to a majority 
voting monetary policy committee. Archer (2005) provides more specific and recent 
information supporting this impression. Norges Bank has a seven-member board that 
makes monetary policy decisions. Two members (the governor and deputy governor) 
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but not necessarily minimizing a loss function for alternative λs). The 
instrument-rate paths might, for instance, differ in the speed at which 
they return to a common normal level. The monetary policy committee 
could then vote on these two or three alternative sets of projections, in 
the same way that it would vote on two or three alternative current 
instrument-rate settings (if there are three alternatives, perhaps by 
first eliminating one alternative as least preferred and then voting 
between the remaining two).
I have suggested a somewhat more general procedure (Svensson 
2003a). Suppose that each monetary policy committee member has a 
preferred instrument-rate plan for the current and future instrument 
rate in the form of a path. All of these paths could be plotted in a 
graph with time on the horizontal axis and the instrument rate on 
the vertical axis. For each future date on the horizontal axis, the 
committee would pick the median instrument-rate level. Recall the 
Median-Voter Theorem: The outcome of majority voting about a 
single variable is the level preferred by the median voter. This is 
the median-voter theorem applied to a path, as if the monetary policy 
committee members were simultaneously voting about the instrument 
rate at the current and future dates. The procedure results in the 
median instrument-rate plan. This median instrument-rate plan 
could serve as the starting point for a new round of voting, with each 
monetary policy committee member suggesting some modification of 
the median instrument-rate plan. The median of these suggestions, 
corresponding to majority voting about the modifications, would be 
chosen as the instrument-rate plan. I would be very surprised if this 
procedure did not converge to a reasonably consistent compromise 
within a couple of rounds.26
Figure 2 illustrates a situation with three monetary policy 
committee members. One member prefers instrument-rate plan 
AC, where A corresponds to the preferred current instrument-rate 
setting. A second member prefers instrument-rate plan BC. The two 
members agree on the instrument rate far into the future but disagree 
on the time to get to that level and on the current instrument-rate 
level. A third member prefers instrument-rate plan DE, with a 
lower current level and a lower future level than the other two. The 
median instrument rate for each date is the instrument rate BC. For 
26. Relying on the median instrument-rate plan also has the attractive property 
that outliers are disregarded: extreme monetary policy committee members will have 
little or no influence on the resulting instrument-rate plan.20 Lars E.O. Svensson 21 Optimal Inflation Targeting
this simple configuration of individual instrument-rate plans, the 
procedure converges in one step.27
Figure 2. Voting on Instrument-Rate Plans
Source: Author.
3. TRANSPARENCY AND COMMUNICATION ISSUES
The internal forecast/decision process and the bank’s announcement 
and communication process are distinct, although the appropriate 
announcement and communication is an important part of managing 
private sector expectations and thereby implementing monetary policy. 
From a transparency and accountability point of view, it is desirable 
that the central bank’s reporting be a correct representation of the 
internal forecast/decision process and its results. However, I see no 
problem with the bank trying out different internal procedures for 
some time and announcing them later, once the bank has decided 
which procedures to follow.
Since monetary policy has an impact on the economy via the 
private sector expectations of inflation, output, and instrument 
rates it gives rise to, announcing the optimal projection—including 
the instrument-rate projection—and the analysis behind it would 
27. For a monetary policy committee with an even number of members, the 
median curve can be defined as the average of the two middle curves. If one member 
(the governor) has the decisive vote in case of a tie, the governor’s vote would decide 
which of the two middle curves is the median. If the committee members’ individual 
instrument-rate plans intersect, the median curve may consist of segments of different 
members’ plans. In this case a few rounds may be required before a reasonably smooth 
and consistent median plan is chosen.22 Lars E.O. Svensson 23 Optimal Inflation Targeting
have the greatest impact on private sector expectations and be 
the most effective way to implement monetary policy. Since the 
optimal projection is the best projection, in the sense of minimizing 
expected squared forecast errors, it also provides the private sector 
with the best aggregate information for making individual decisions. 
Announcing the optimal projections also allows for the most precise 
and sophisticated external evaluation of the monetary policy 
framework and decisions.
Morris and Shin (2002) present a result indicating that more 
public information may reduce social welfare. This result has received 
considerable attention and been interpreted as arguing against 
transparency (Amato, Morris, and Shin, 2002; Amato and Shin, 
2003; Economist, 2004). However, Svensson (2006) shows that some 
scrutiny of the result reveals that it has been misinterpreted and is 
actually pro transparency: except in very special circumstances (when 
the precisions of private information is more than eight times higher 
than that of public information), more public information increases 
social welfare. In particular, for a conservative benchmark of equal 
precision in public and private information, social welfare is higher 
than it is without public information.28
The announcement of the optimal instrument-rate projection could 
include fan charts to emphasize that the projection is a probability 
distribution conditional on current information and judgment and 
that only with probability zero would future decisions be exactly equal 
to the central projection. Goodhart (2005) and Mishkin (2004) have 
warned that the instrument-rate projection might be interpreted as 
an unconditional commitment. Some special explanation may indeed 
be required to emphasize that the instrument-rate projection is not 
a commitment but only the best forecast, the best plan, conditional 
on current information and judgment and that future decisions and 
future projections would normally change to reflect new information 
and judgment. Experience from New Zealand indicates that the market 
and private sector have no problem understanding that projections 
are conditioned on current information and will change with new 
information (Archer, 2004, 2005; Svensson, 2001a). Furthermore, 
educating the market and the general public about monetary policy 
is a natural part of successful inflation targeting.
28. Woodford (2005) shows that a slight change in the social welfare measure, such 
that it is proportional to individual welfare, makes social welfare always increasing 
in transparency.22 Lars E.O. Svensson 23 Optimal Inflation Targeting
This discussion concerns conveying the bank’s optimal projection 
of inflation, the output gap, and the instrument rate to the private 
sector. It does not attempt to convey the bank’s reaction function, that 
is, how current instrument setting depends on current information and 
judgment. This reaction function is, in my view, too complex to ever be 
explicitly expressed, even within the bank. The optimal instrument-
rate decision depends in a complex way on all the information and 
judgment used in the forecasting process. The reaction function is, in 
my view, best left implicit. (For more detail on this issue, see Svensson 
2003c, 2005b.) Fortunately, the decision process proposed above does 
not require that central bank’s reaction function be explicit.29
In short, I believe that the best instrument-rate decisions, the most 
effective implementation of monetary policy, and the most satisfactory 
degree of transparency and accountability can be achieved with the 
moderately formal framework discussed above. Let me now discuss 
a few additional points.
4. INCORPORATING JUDGMENT
The framework proposed above can be used with projections that 
are largely judgmental, with projections that are largely model based, 
or any combination of the two. Svensson (2005b) discusses in greater 
detail how central bank judgment—information, knowledge, and 
views beyond the scope of a particular model—can be incorporated 
into optimal projections in a consistent way. Svensson and Tetlow 
(2005) describe a practical a way of doing so, the method of optimal 
policy projections, which is in use at the Federal Reserve Board. 
My view is that models are very useful in practical monetary 
policy, but a substantial amount of judgment always needs to be 
applied. I doubt that good monetary policy can ever be conducted 
without a substantial amount of judgment. Any model is always 
a drastic simplification of a complex economy; judgment, in the 
form of information, knowledge, and views outside the scope of a 
particular model, will always be necessary. The challenge is to apply 
good judgment in a disciplined and systematic way rather than in a 
completely discretionary and ad hoc way.
29. Although it is in principle true that inflation targeting can be described as an 
ex ante inflation target and an optimal instrument-rate response to observable shocks, 
as King (1996) notes, in practice the number of potential shocks is so large that the 
optimal response to all possible observable shocks cannot be made explicit.24 Lars E.O. Svensson 25 Optimal Inflation Targeting
Figure 3 shows a situation discussed in Svensson (2005b), based on 
the empirical model of the U.S. economy of Rudebusch and Svensson 
(1999).30 The inflation and output gaps have been equal to their 
steady-state levels, zero, up to quarter 0. In panel a, the central bank 
receives new information in quarter 0 about a shock to inflation, the 
inflation deviation, in quarter 6 with a mean of 1 percentage point and 
possibly a large variance; the anticipated mean deviation of inflation 
equals zero for other future quarters. The central bank’s judgment 
in quarter 0, the mean inflation deviations, is marked by circles with 
no connecting line.
30. Svensson (2005b) also provides an example with an empirical forward-looking 
model of the U.S. economy by Lindé (2002).
Figure 3. Monetary Policy with and without Central Bank 
Judgment
  A. Inflation  B. Inflation
  deviation w/ judgment  deviation w/o judgment
  C. Output-gap  D. Output-gap
  deviation w/ judgment  deviation w/o judgment
Source: Svensson (2005b)24 Lars E.O. Svensson 25 Optimal Inflation Targeting
It is important to realize that this example of central bank 
judgment does not amount to the assumption that the central bank 
has perfect foresight about future shocks. On the contrary. Judgment 
about future inflation deviations is in the form of probability means. 
Behind these means would normally be a perceived probability 
distribution of inflation deviations with considerable uncertainty. 
The variance of this distribution could be very large. However, under 
the assumptions made, it is only the mean of the distribution that 
matters for policy.
Panel a shows the optimal policy projection in quarter 0, 
π π
0 0 0 − ) ( *, , x i , of the inflation gap, π – π* (the dashed line); the 
output gap, x (the dashed-dotted line); and the instrument rate, i 
(the solid line).31 The panel shows that when the central bank expects 
a 1 percentage point inflation deviation in quarter 6, it chooses an 
optimal instrument-rate projection such that the instrument rate is 
raised to about 1 percentage point during the first few quarters and 
then gradually lowered back to its steady-state level. As a result the 
projected output gap gradually falls to about -0.5 percentage points 
in quarter 7 and then very gradually rises back toward zero. The 
inflation projection shows inflation falling slightly before it is hit by 
the inflation deviation in quarter 6, then rising to almost 1 percentage 
point before finally falling back toward its steady-state level after 
quarter 6. Thus the optimal policy projection is a clear example of 
preemptive monetary policy: the instrument rate is raised and the 
output gap reduced well before the expected inflation deviation shock, 
in order to efficiently control inflation and bring it back to target after 
the shock. The optimal policy projection in quarter 0 results in an 
expected intertemporal loss of 4.2 units.32 
Panel b shows the projection of the same variables for the same 
expected inflation deviation. However, in this panel the central bank 
disregards judgment in each quarter, while still responding optimally 
to the predetermined variables (current and past inflation and output 
gaps). The central bank responds in the same way to the predetermined 
variables as in the optimal policy, but it does not respond to any 
expected future deviation. It behaves as if it believes that the deviation 
31. The optimal projection is calculated for a period loss function defined over 






, with λ = 1, υ = 0.2, and a 
discount factor δ = 1.
32. Given how the target variables are measured, with the given loss function and 
δ = 1, an expected difference of inflation from target of one (two) annualized percentage 
point(s) for a single quarter gives rise to an intertemporal loss of one (four) units.26 Lars E.O. Svensson 27 Optimal Inflation Targeting
is a serially uncorrelated zero-mean process, so its expected future 
deviations are zero. The central bank then keeps the instrument rate 
at its steady-state level through quarter 5. Accordingly, inflation and 
the output gap remain at the steady-state levels through quarter 5. In 
quarter 6 the inflation shock hits and inflation jumps to 1 percentage 
point, while the predetermined output gap remains at zero. In this 
situation, once the inflation shock has hit, the optimal monetary policy 
response is to raise the instrument rate substantially, to more than 
1.5 percentage points above the steady-state level during the following 
few quarters. This reduces the output gap to almost -0.5 percentage 
points during the next eight to nine quarters. The instrument rate 
is gradually lowered back to the steady-state level, and inflation and 
the output gap return to their steady-state levels very slowly. The 
absence of any preemption requires a larger instrument-rate response 
when the shock occurs; the output gap is nevertheless reduced, with 
a considerable lag, and inflation stays above target for a long time. 
The resulting intertemporal loss is 6.3 units—2.1 units higher than 
when monetary policy relies on judgment. (Panels c and d illustrate 
analogous experiments for an expected output deviation in quarter 
6; for more detail, see Svensson 2005b.)
This example shows a substantial difference between monetary 
policy with and without judgment, with significant differences in the 
development of the target variables and corresponding intertemporal 
losses. It indicates the importance of taking central bank judgment 
into account.
4. UNCERTAINTY, “MEAN” FORECAST TARGETING, AND 
“DISTRIBUTION” FORECAST TARGETING
Monetary policy is always conducted under substantial uncertainty. 
The projections discussed above can be interpreted as mean projections 
of future random variables, and the procedures discussed above can be 
called mean forecast targeting. Strictly speaking, mean projections are 
sufficient for optimal policy only under certainty equivalence, which 
requires a known linear model and a quadratic loss function and only 
additive uncertain shocks. 
When certainty equivalence is violated— because uncertainty is 
multiplicative and not just additive, for instance—mean projections 
are not sufficient for optimal policy. In this case the entire distribution 
of future random target variables matters. 26 Lars E.O. Svensson 27 Optimal Inflation Targeting
Svensson and Williams (2005) develop a flexible and powerful but 
still tractable framework for optimal monetary policy under model 
uncertainty. Their framework extends the so-called Markov jump 
linear-quadratic framework to include forward-looking variables.33 
In principle, the forecast targeting procedure discussed here can be 
carried out using projections of probability distributions—distribution 
projections—rather than mean projections. In this case the procedures 
can be called distribution forecast targeting. It is too early to tell 
whether in most situations for monetary policy the difference between 
mean forecast targeting and distribution forecast targeting is large 
enough to matter for policy.
In both mean and distribution forecast targeting, the uncertainty of the 
projections can conveniently be illustrated with fan charts. The methods 
of Svensson and Williams (2005) allow the convenient construction and 
plotting of theoretically and empirically consistent fan charts under both 
certainty equivalence and certainty nonequivalence.
Figure 4 shows the probability distribution of an optimal projection 
of inflation, the output gap, and the instrument rate for a three-mode 
version of the Lindé (2002) empirical neo-Keynesian model of the U.S. 
economy. This model is used as one example in Svensson and Williams 
(2005) (another example used there is a three-mode version of the 
Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999 model). Model uncertainty is modeled as 
a Markov process that jumps among three alternative modes, with each 
mode having a different set of model coefficients (that is, a three-mode 
regime-switching model). The modes are not directly observed by the 
central bank. The central bank then conducts optimal policy conditional 
on its subjective probability distribution of the modes—in this case the 
stationary distribution of the modes. Svensson and Williams (2005) 
provide details of the Bayesian method used to estimate the mode-
dependent model parameters, the transition probabilities of the modes, 
and the variance of the mode-dependent additive shocks.
The figure shows the optimal projection of inflation (measured 
as the difference from the inflation target), the output gap, and the 
instrument rate starting from an initial situation in quarter 0, when 
inflation exceeded the inflation target by 1 percentage point and the 
instrument rate was equal to 1 percentage point the previous quarter, 
quarter -1. From quarter 0 the economy is subject to unobserved jumps 
between model modes with estimated transition probabilities, as well 
33. Zampolli (2005) uses a Markov jump linear-quadratic framework to examine 
optimal policy with switching exchange rate dynamics.29 Optimal Inflation Targeting
Figure 4. Optimal Projection of Inflation, the Output Gap, 





Source: Svensson and Williams (2005)
Note: Solid lines show the mean projection. Dashed lines show the optimal mean projection for constant coefficients. 
The dark shading shows the 30 percent probability band. The medium shading shows the 60 percent probability 
band. The light shading shows the 90 percent probability band. 29 Optimal Inflation Targeting
as additive shocks with estimated mode-dependent variance. Thus 
the simulation takes into account both additive and multiplicative 
uncertainty, with empirical distributions for both kinds of uncertainty. 
The probability distribution was simulated with 10,000 realizations 
of the Markov chain. 
The light gray bands (90 percent probability) show that the 
projection’s probability distribution has relatively wide tails; 
the medium (60 percent probability) and dark gray (30 percent 
probability) shades show that most of the probability mass is 
relatively concentrated for the inflation and output-gap projection. 
The probability distribution for the instrument-rate projection is 
wider than for inflation and the output gap. It is also somewhat 
asymmetric. This is apparent since the median projection, which will 
be within the dark gray band, differs from the mean projection, shown 
by the solid line. The probability distribution seems to converge to a 
stationary distribution after about 12 quarters.
The Markov jump linear-quadratic framework approach to model 
uncertainty can be combined with the “additive” central bank judgment 
discussed in Svensson (2005b). Furthermore, it allows the introduction 
of “multiplicative” central bank judgment, such as the judgment that 
model uncertainty is temporarily “high,” “normal,” or “low.” Optimal 
policy projections can then be computed for these alternative levels of 
perceived model uncertainty. Svensson and Williams (2005) provide 
further discussion of these and other extensions.
6. OPTIMIZATION UNDER COMMITMENT, THE TIMELESS 
PERSPECTIVE, AND DISCRETION
When forward-looking private sector expectations are important, 
optimization under commitment differs from optimization under 
discretion. The behavior of some central banks is probably better 
described as optimization under discretion, where each new decision 
is made from scratch, regardless of previous promises and statements. 
Indeed, some observers who are opposed to the idea of publishing 
instrument-rate projections have referred to the undesirability of 
such projections, because they might be interpreted by the private 
sector as commitments and thereby restrict the bank’s freedom to 
act (Mishkin 2004).
From a normative point of view, and when policy advice is given, 
optimization under commitment is the obvious standard, since policy 
under commitment, when commitment is possible, results in better 30 Lars E.O. Svensson 31 Optimal Inflation Targeting
outcomes. Furthermore, the issue of consistent reoptimization under 
commitment can be handled with optimization under commitment in 
the timeless perspective (Woodford, 2003; Svensson and Woodford, 
2005). Svensson (2005b) provides details under certainty equivalence; 
Svensson and Williams (2005) examine the case of noncertainty 
equivalence.
7. THE OUTPUT GAP, POTENTIAL OUTPUT, THE INTEREST-
RATE GAP, AND THE NEUTRAL INTEREST RATE
The output gap—the difference between output and potential 
output—has been used as a generic variable indicating the state of 
the business cycle. However, in modern views of the transmission 
mechanism, the output gap is an import variable and far from 
arbitrary. In this regard, the theoretically most satisfactory concept 
of potential output is the hypothetical output level that would result 
in the economy if all prices and wages were completely flexible. This 
means that potential output is time varying, shock dependent, and 
not a simple trend. 
Because the output gap and potential output gap are crucial 
variables in the transmission mechanism, it makes sense for central 
banks to devote a fair amount of resources to estimating potential 
output, constructing projections of potential output and the output 
gap, and publishing those estimates and projections, especially if the 
output gap is an implicit or explicit target variable. The fact that 
estimates and projections of potential output and the output gap 
are quite uncertain does not diminish their importance and is not a 
reason not to publish them (contrary to what Mishkin, 2004 argues). 
Generally, a simple principle for transparency is that the central bank 
should publish projections of all its target variables. If a central bank 
sets the employment or unemployment gap (defined as the difference 
between employment [unemployment] and “potential” employment 
[unemployment]), as a target variable, it should publish estimates 
and projections of these measures as well. (The theoretically most 
satisfactory definition of “potential” is the hypothetical level in an 
economy with completely flexible prices and wages.)
In modern views of the transmission mechanism, the most 
appropriate measure of monetary policy stance is the projection of 
the current and future interest-rate gap—the difference between the 
real instrument rate and the neutral real interest rate. The neutral 
real interest rate (the Wicksellian natural real interest rate) is the 30 Lars E.O. Svensson 31 Optimal Inflation Targeting
hypothetical real short-term interest rate that would result in the 
economy if prices and wages were completely flexible. It is time 
varying, shock dependent, and not a simple average of past real 
interest rates. The neutral real interest rate and potential output 
are related. In the simplest case, the neutral real interest rate is 
the sum of the rate of time preference and a term equal to expected 
growth of potential output divided by the intertemporal elasticity of 
consumption. The most appropriate measure of monetary policy stance 
is then given by the projection of the current and future interest-rate 
gap (see appendix). Given the importance of this concept in modern 
views of the transmission mechanism, it makes sense that central 
banks estimate, use, and publish estimates of it.
8. CONCLUSIONS
Inflation-targeting central banks can improve their targeting 
by being more specific, systematic, and transparent about their 
operational objectives (by using an explicit intertemporal loss 
function), their forecasts (by deciding on optimal projections of the 
instrument rate and the target variables), and their communication 
(by announcing optimal projections of the instrument rate and target 
variables). Progress can also be made by incorporating central bank 
judgment and model uncertainty in a systematic way in the forecasting 
and decisionmaking process. In particular, incorporating model 
uncertainty allows the central bank to target based on more general 
distribution forecast rather than on the more restrictive mean forecasts 
under the assumption of approximate certainty equivalence.32 Lars E.O. Svensson 33 Optimal Inflation Targeting
APPENDIX
The Loss Function and the Interest-Rate Gap
A. The Loss Function
Let the period loss function be as shown in expression (1). 
Assume that δ is arbitrary close to unity. Note that the limit of the 
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under the assumption thatE xt   = 0 . Then the intertemporal loss is 
given by the sum of three terms. The first is the squared deviation 
from the inflation target of the unconditional (that is, long-run) mean 
of inflation. The second is the unconditional variance of inflation. The 
third is the product of λ and the long-run variance of the output gap. 
Hence λ can be interpreted as the weight on variance of the output 
gap relative to the weight on variance of inflation (or squared long-run 
deviations of inflation from the inflation target).
B. The Interest-Rate Gap
That the projection of the current and future interest-rate gap 
is an appropriate indicator of the monetary policy stance can most 
easily be demonstrated in a simple neo-Keynesian model of aggregate 
demand. Let aggregate demand be given by
y y r t t t t t = − − ( ) +1 σ ρ ,                                                                       (A.2)
where yt denotes (log) output in period t, zt+τ|t denotes Etzt+τ (the 
rational expectation in period t of the realization of variable zt+τ in 
period t + τ), σ > 0 denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
rt denotes a short-term (one-period) real interest rate, and ρt denotes 
the rate of time preference between period t and period t + 1 and is 32 Lars E.O. Svensson 33 Optimal Inflation Targeting
an exogenous stochastic process. The short-term real interest rate is 
defined by
r i t t t t ≡ − + π 1 ,                                                                                   (A.3)
where it is a short-term (one-period) nominal interest rate and πt+1|t 
denotes the rational expectation in period t of inflation between period 
t and period t + 1. Equation (A.2) follows from a first-order condition 
for optimal intertemporal consumption choice with an additively 
separable utility function for a representative consumer with constant 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ and a stochastic subjective 
discount factor whose logarithm is ρt.
Let yt denote (log) potential output, and assume that it is an 
exogenous stochastic process. Define the neutral real interest rate, 
r t , as the real interest rate for which output in (A.2) equals potential 
output. This gives
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so the neutral interest rate equals the sum of the rate of time preference 
and expected potential output growth divided by the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution.
Define the output gap as the difference between (log) output and 
(log) potential output,
x y y t t t = − .                                                                                     (A.5)
Using expressions (A.4) and (A.5) in (A.2) results in
x x r r t t t t t = − − ( ) +1 σ .                                                                       (A.6)
The output gap in period t depends on the expected output 
gap in period t + 1 and the current interest-rate gap,r r t t − . (The 
nominal and the real interest-rate gaps are the same, if we 
identifyr t t t + + π 1 with the nominal neutral interest rate, since
r r r r i r t t t t t t t t t t t t − = + − − = − + ( ) + + + π π π 1 1 1 ).
Solving (A.6) forward T periods gives
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Assume that the expected output gap far into the future 
approaches zero ( xt T t + → 0whenT → ∞), and assume that the 
sum in (A.7) converges whenT → ∞(that is, that r r t T t t T t + + − → 0
sufficiently fast whenT → 0 ). Then we can letT → 0 in (A.7), yielding 
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. The projection of 
the current and future interest-rate gap,r r r r r r
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contains all the information about the monetary policy stance.34 Lars E.O. Svensson 35 Optimal Inflation Targeting
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